



Capital Cooperation and Production Transactions among Salt Farmers: An Islamic Economic Contract Perspective at UD. Setia Kawan, Bali

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Abstract

This study examines capital cooperation and production transactions between salt farmers and business actors at UD. Setia Kawan, Pejarakan Village, Buleleng Regency, Bali, from the perspective of Islamic economic contract principles. The study aims to analyze the cooperation structure, capital provision, production management, output transactions, price determination, profit-sharing mechanisms, capital repayment, and production risks. A qualitative field research approach was employed through observation, interviews, and documentation involving four informants consisting of business actors and salt farmers. Data were analyzed through data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification, with validity strengthened through source, technique, and time triangulation. The findings show that cooperation is established through oral agreements based on mutual trust. Business actors provide capital, equipment, pond maintenance, and operational costs, while farmers manage salt production. Harvested salt is generally sold to the capital provider, who has a primary role in determining prices based on market conditions, quality, and production quantity. Profit sharing and capital repayment are agreed upon at the beginning, although detailed quantitative data on profit distribution are unavailable. Weather is the main production risk, and insufficient harvests may result in outstanding capital obligations being carried over to the following season. The findings highlight the need for clarity, mutual consent, transparency, and balanced rights and obligations.

Kata kunci:

kerja sama modal; petani garam; kontrak ekonomi Islam; pembagian keuntungan; produksi garam.

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Abstrak

Studi ini meneliti kerja sama modal dan transaksi produksi antara petani garam dan pelaku bisnis di UD. Setia Kawan, Desa Pejarakan, Kabupaten Buleleng, Bali, dari perspektif prinsip kontrak ekonomi Islam. Studi ini bertujuan menganalisis struktur kerja sama, penyediaan modal, manajemen produksi, transaksi output, penentuan harga, mekanisme pembagian keuntungan, pelunasan modal, dan risiko produksi. Pendekatan penelitian lapangan kualitatif digunakan melalui observasi, wawancara, dan dokumentasi yang melibatkan empat informan yang terdiri dari pelaku bisnis dan petani garam. Data dianalisis melalui kondensasi data, tampilan data, serta pengambilan kesimpulan dan verifikasi, dengan validitas diperkuat melalui triangulasi sumber, teknik, dan waktu. Temuan menunjukkan bahwa kerja sama dibangun melalui perjanjian lisan berdasarkan kepercayaan bersama. Pelaku bisnis menyediakan modal, peralatan, pemeliharaan kolam, dan biaya operasional, sementara petani mengelola produksi garam. Garam hasil panen umumnya dijual kepada penyedia modal, yang memiliki peran utama dalam menentukan harga berdasarkan kondisi pasar, kualitas, dan jumlah produksi. Pembagian keuntungan dan pelunasan modal disepakati di awal, meskipun data kuantitatif rinci tentang distribusi keuntungan tidak tersedia. Cuaca adalah risiko utama produksi, dan panen yang tidak memadai dapat menyebabkan kewajiban modal yang belum terselesaikan dibawa ke musim berikutnya. Temuan ini menyoroti perlunya kejelasan, kesepakatan bersama, transparansi, serta hak dan kewajiban yang seimbang.

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INTRODUCTION

Salt is one of the commodities that holds an important position in the economic activities of coastal communities. For some communities, salt production is not only an economic activity but also a source of livelihood that has been carried out from generation to generation. However, the sustainability of salt production at the farmer level faces problems related to limited capital, technology, and market access. This condition encourages the establishment of cooperation between salt farmers and business actors as one of the mechanisms for meeting financing needs while simultaneously ensuring the absorption of production output. In this context, the relationship between capital owners and farmers is not only related to production activities but also involves a series of economic transactions in the form of capital provision, sale of production output, price determination, and profit sharing (Purnomo et al., 2026) .

Such capital relationships are relevant to the concept of contracts in Islamic economics, particularly the *mudharabah* contract, namely a cooperation between the capital owner (*shahib al-mal*) and the business manager (*mudharib*) with the objective of obtaining profits based on an agreement. In the principle of *muamalah*, economic contracts are not only assessed based on the existence of an agreement between the parties, but also based on the clarity of the contract, mutual consent, justice, trustworthiness, and transparency in the rights and obligations of each party. Therefore, forms of cooperation that substantially resemble *mudharabah* need to be examined more deeply, particularly when the capital relationship also determines how production output is marketed and how profits are obtained by each party (Kayed, 2012)

This issue is important because the relationship between farmers and capital owners may create economic dependence. Limited access to other sources of financing may place farmers in a weaker bargaining position in determining the terms of cooperation. Several studies referred to in this research indicate problems in salt-farming cooperation practices, including inequality in profit sharing, limited access to capital, and the dominance of certain parties in determining production prices. Research on profit-sharing patterns and profit distribution among salt farmers, for example, indicates problems of inequality in profit distribution between farmers and business actors. Other studies also show that external capital systems for salt farmers have not yet been fully capable of creating an optimal distribution of profits (Utama et al., 2025)

Nevertheless, studies on cooperation among salt farmers from the perspective of Islamic economics still provide room for further development. Previous research has largely discussed profit sharing, capital, production prices, or the application of *muamalah* principles separately. Meanwhile, the relationship between capital contracts and production-output transactions as a single series of economic relationships has not been specifically examined to a great extent. In practice, however, the provision of capital may be directly related to obligations to sell production output, price-determination mechanisms, capital repayment, and profit sharing. Therefore, contract analysis cannot stop at identifying the party providing the capital and the party managing the business, but must also examine

how the contract operates throughout the economic transaction process (Klein, 1982a)

This gap is relevant in the context of cooperation between salt farmers and business actors at UD. Setia Kawan, Pejarakan Village, Gerokgak District, Buleleng Regency, Bali. This research views the practice not merely as a profit-sharing relationship, but as a contractual mechanism that connects capital with the production and transaction of salt output. This focus enables the research to examine more comprehensively how agreements are formed, how capital is provided, how production output is transacted, how prices are determined, how proceeds are distributed, and how the rights and obligations of the parties operate in practice.

Through this approach, the research contributes to the development of Islamic economics studies by placing contracts and transactions as a unified analytical framework, rather than merely assessing practices based on their conformity with the term *mudharabah*. This perspective is important for identifying the extent to which the principles of justice, transparency, mutual consent, and balance between the rights and obligations of the parties can be realized in the economic relationship between farmers and business actors. Thus, this research not only provides an empirical description of capital cooperation practices in the salt-farming sector but also illustrates contractual issues that arise when financing relationships are integrated with production-output transactions (Van der Borghet & Gómez, 2024) .

Based on the foregoing description, this research aims to analyze the form and mechanism of capital cooperation contracts between salt farmers and business actors, examine the implementation of production-output transactions, including sales, price determination, profit sharing, and the rights and obligations of the parties, and analyze these practices based on the principles of contracts in Islamic economics. Thus, this research is expected to enrich empirical studies on the application of Islamic contracts in economic transactions within communities, particularly in the people's salt-farming sect

RESEARCH METHOD

This research uses a qualitative approach with field research conducted in Pejarakan Village, focusing on the capital cooperation practices between salt farmers and business actors at UD. Setia Kawan. The research data consist of primary and secondary data.

Primary data were obtained through observation, interviews, and documentation involving four informants consisting of business actors and salt farmers involved in the cooperation practices. The data collected include the form of the contract, the capital mechanism, the production process, the sale of harvested output, price determination, profit sharing, the rights and obligations of the parties, and risks in the implementation of the cooperation.

Secondary data consist of scientific literature, books, articles, documents, and other sources relevant to Islamic contracts and economic transactions. Data analysis was conducted interactively through data condensation, data

display, and conclusion drawing and verification. The validity of the data was tested through triangulation of sources, techniques, and time (Anderson et al., 1991).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Result

Structure of the Capital Cooperation Contract

The research findings show that the cooperation between salt farmers and business actors at UD. Setia Kawan, Pejarakan Village, is established through a capital relationship that connects business actors as capital providers with farmers as managers of production activities. Business actors provide various needs required during the salt production process, while farmers are responsible for managing the salt ponds until salt is produced. The form of capital provided is not limited to cash, but may also include production equipment, pond maintenance costs, operational costs, and other needs related to production activities.

Samsul Arifin, as a business actor, explained that the cooperation with farmers is basically built upon a relationship of mutual assistance. Business actors provide capital to meet production needs, such as purchasing equipment, maintaining ponds, and covering operational costs during the production process. Farmers then manage the ponds, starting from the process of managing seawater until the salt is harvested. After the harvest, the proceeds from the sale are distributed based on the agreement discussed at the beginning of the cooperation.

From the farmers' perspective, limited capital is one of the main reasons for establishing such cooperation. Abu Chairudin stated that salt production costs require relatively large capital, so farmers need assistance from business actors so that production activities can continue. In addition to providing capital, business actors also play a role in purchasing the harvest, thereby providing farmers with access to markets for their production.

These findings indicate that the cooperation relationship not only creates a capital relationship but also simultaneously establishes a transactional relationship between farmers as producers and business actors as parties that receive and market the production. Thus, in practice, the contract has a broader function because it connects capital, production, and production transactions within a single series of economic relationships.

Oral Contract Based on Trust

One of the main characteristics of the contract identified in the research is the use of an oral agreement. The interview results show that the cooperation between farmers and business actors is not set forth in a written agreement. The agreement is made directly when the business actor provides capital assistance, and its implementation is based on the trust that has been established between the two parties.

Abu Chairudin explained that farmers have so far used oral agreements and do not have letters or written agreements. This relationship can continue because of the trust between farmers and business actors. However, when certain conditions arise, particularly those relating to profit sharing or a decrease in harvest yields, the issue can be discussed again between the two parties.

This information was reinforced by Moh. Mahrus, who explained that the agreement is made when the business actor provides capital to the farmer. According to him, the cooperation is carried out orally and relies largely on the trust that has been established. The agreement discusses capital, the sale of production output, salt prices, profit sharing, and capital repayment.

These findings demonstrate that trust serves as the primary foundation in the formation of informal contracts. Trust enables transactions to take place without the use of written contractual instruments. However, this pattern also indicates that not all possibilities arising during the production period are explicitly stipulated from the outset.

Capital Mechanism and Obligations of the Parties

The provision of capital is the initial stage that establishes the cooperation relationship between farmers and business actors. The research data show that capital may be provided before production begins and may also be increased during the production process if farmers experience a shortage of funds. The assistance includes cash, production equipment, pond repair costs, operational costs, and other needs related to production activities.

Samsul Arifin explained that if farmers experience a shortage of funds during the production process, business actors may provide additional capital so that production activities can continue until the harvest period. Thus, the capital relationship does not always take place through a single transaction but may continue according to the farmers' production needs.

On the farmers' side, the capital is used to support the entire salt production process. Farmers are responsible for managing the ponds, carrying out the production process, maintaining production activities until the harvest period, and producing salt, which subsequently enters into the transaction mechanism with the business actors.

The capital provided is subsequently calculated when the production output is sold. If the harvest has not been sufficient to cover the capital that has been provided, the remaining obligation may be carried over to the following production season.

This pattern shows that capital occupies a central position in the overall contractual relationship. Capital serves as the starting point of the relationship, while production output becomes the means of settling the economic relationship. Thus, the relationship established can be understood through the following sequence: 1. Provision of capital, 2. Production, 3. Harvest, 4. transaction of output, 5. calculation of capital, 6. settlement of obligations.

Production Transactions within the Capital Relationship

The research findings show that salt production output is generally sold to the business actor who previously provided the capital. Moh. Mahrus explained that within the cooperation, there is an agreement that the harvest is sold to the party providing the capital. The price of salt, profit sharing, and capital repayment are discussed at the beginning of the cooperation.

Samsul Arifin provided a consistent explanation that farmers' production output is usually sold to the business actor who provides the capital. After the

harvest is completed, the production output is handed over to the business actor to be subsequently marketed.

The data indicate a connection between capital transactions and production-output transactions. Farmers obtain capital to carry out production, while business actors obtain access to the production output after the harvest period. Thus, the economic relationship established takes place within a series that connects financing at the initial stage with commodity transactions at the subsequent stage.

This relationship can be formulated as: Production capital, production output, sale to the capital provider, marketing.

This interconnection is an important characteristic of the contractual structure under study. The production-output transaction does not entirely stand as a transaction separate from the capital relationship, but takes place within the context of the cooperation that had previously been established.

Price Determination in Salt Transactions

The research findings show that business actors have a primary role in determining the purchase price of salt. Abu Chairudin explained that prices are determined by considering market conditions, salt quality, and the quantity of production. In practice, farmers follow the price determined by business actors. This role cannot be separated from the position of business actors as both capital providers and buyers of production output. Meanwhile, farmers occupy the position of capital recipients and salt producers. This condition causes the capital relationship and the production-output transaction to take place within the same economic network.

Ahmad Dodi explained that limited capital causes farmers to continue to require assistance from business actors. This condition affects farmers' ability to determine the selling price of salt as well as their ability to negotiate cooperation agreements.

The research data also show complaints from farmers regarding low salt prices when production is abundant. This condition causes farmers' income to be unstable.

These findings indicate differences in position in the transaction process, particularly in price formation. Business actors have access to capital and marketing, while farmers depend on capital to carry out production.

Nevertheless, this research does not yet have quantitative data that would allow for the calculation of the margin between the purchase price paid by business actors and the resale price in the market. Therefore, the research does not draw conclusions regarding the amount of economic profit obtained by each party.

Profit-Sharing Mechanism

Profit sharing is one of the elements discussed in the cooperation relationship. Samsul Arifin explained that after the harvest, the proceeds from sales are distributed based on the agreement discussed at the beginning of the cooperation. Moh. Mahrus also stated that the price of salt, profit sharing, and capital repayment are discussed and agreed upon at the beginning of the cooperation relationship.

Thus, the data show that profit sharing has become part of the agreement structure between farmers and business actors. However, the available data do not yet indicate in detail the amount of capital provided by each farmer, production volume, production costs, purchase price per unit, percentage of profit sharing, or the amount of profit received by each party.

On this basis, the findings of this research are placed at the level of the profit-sharing mechanism, rather than at the level of measuring profit distribution. This limitation is necessary so that the interpretation of the research remains consistent with the available empirical evidence.

Production Risk and Contract Sustainability

Salt production has a high dependence on weather conditions. The research data show that sunlight is an important factor in the production process, while rain and the rainy season can cause a decline in production and even crop failure. Abu Chairudin explained that the greatest risk faced by farmers comes from weather because salt production is highly dependent on sunlight. When rain occurs or weather conditions are unfavorable, production can decline significantly.

Under conditions of crop failure, farmers continue to face obligations related to the capital that has been provided. Abu Chairudin explained that such circumstances may cause economic difficulties when the harvest is insufficient to cover production costs and daily needs.

Other data show that when the harvest has not been sufficient to cover the capital that has been provided, the remaining obligation can be carried over to the following production season.

Ahmad Dodi also identified weather as one of the main obstacles in salt production. When the weather is uncertain or the rainy season begins, production output decreases.

These findings show that production risk is an integral part of the contractual relationship. Salt production faces uncertainty arising from natural factors, while obligations related to capital remain part of the economic relationship when production output does not correspond to expectations.

Synthesis of Contract and Transaction Findings

Based on the overall research data, the cooperation contract between salt farmers and business actors can be formulated as an economic relationship that integrates several stages of transactions, beginning with the provision of capital and continuing through the settlement of production output.

Table 1: Structure of the Capital Cooperation Contract and Salt Transactions

Component	Practice Identified
Parties	Salt farmers and business actors
Beginning of relationship	Provision of capital assistance
Form of agreement	Oral
Basis Of Relationship	Trust
Form Of Capital	Money, production equipment, pond maintenance, operational costs, and other needs

Production management	Carried out by farmers
Business output	Salt production
Production transaction	Production output is generally sold to the capital provider
Price determination	Business actors have the primary role
Price considerations	Market conditions, quality, and production quantity
Profit Sharing	Discussed and Agreed upon Within The Cooperations
Capital Repayment	Calculated Trough Production Output
Insufficient output	Remaining obligations may be carried over to the following season
Main risks	Weather, declining production, and crop failure

The synthesis produces three main characteristics. First, the contract takes place informally through an oral agreement and is based on trust. Second, the capital contract is directly related to the production-output transaction because the harvest is generally sold to the party providing the capital. Third, the implementation of the contract takes place under production conditions involving high risks, while obligations related to capital may continue when the harvest is insufficient.

Thus, the research findings show that the contract in the salt-farming business practice is not merely an agreement concerning the provision of capital, but rather a mechanism that regulates the economic relationship throughout the production and transaction cycle. The contract connects the interests of business actors as capital providers and buyers of output with the interests of farmers as production managers.

At this point, the issue of Islamic contracts becomes relevant. The structure of the relationship identified indicates the need for clarity regarding the form of capital, rights and obligations, price mechanisms, profit sharing, capital repayment, and risk distribution. Therefore, the subsequent discussion needs to examine this empirical structure against the principles of Islamic economic contracts and relevant literature, rather than simply categorizing it directly into a particular type of contract.

Discussion

The findings of this study indicate that the cooperation between salt farmers and business actors at UD. Setia Kawan cannot be understood merely as a relationship involving the provision of capital. The relationship integrates capital provision, production activities, the sale of production output, price determination, profit sharing, capital repayment, and production risks within a continuous economic relationship. Therefore, the substance of the relationship between the parties needs to be examined comprehensively. The existence of capital, production activities, sales of output, profit sharing, and capital repayment are interconnected elements in determining the actual character of the contract. Consequently, identification of the form of contract cannot be based solely on the terminology used by the parties, but needs to consider the entirety of the transaction practices that take place (Patterson, 1964)

The oral nature of the agreement is another important aspect of the contractual relationship. The research findings show that the cooperation is based on trust and is not formalized through a written agreement. From the perspective of Islamic economic contracts, the issue is important because the quality of a

contract is not determined solely by its form, but also by the clarity of the substance of the agreement. An oral agreement may serve as the basis for a relationship between the parties as long as the agreed elements and provisions can be clearly understood. However, the more complex the economic relationship established, the more important it becomes to clarify the transaction object, rights and obligations, profit mechanisms, prices, capital repayment, and treatment of risks (Klein, 1982b)

The position of capital in this relationship is also significant. Capital constitutes the starting point of the relationship, while production output becomes a means of settling the resulting economic relationship. The capital may be provided before production begins and may be increased during production when farmers experience a shortage of funds. This means that the capital relationship does not necessarily occur through a single transaction but may continue according to production needs. In the perspective of Islamic economic contracts, such a structure indicates the importance of viewing the substance of the contract comprehensively because a single agreement may produce economic consequences across several stages of the transaction. Clarity regarding the form and use of capital, production obligations, capital settlement mechanisms, and the treatment of insufficient output therefore becomes an important element of contractual certainty (Bernstein, 2015).

The relationship between capital provision and production-output transactions further strengthens the integrated character of the economic relationship. Farmers receive capital to carry out production, while business actors obtain access to the production output after the harvest. The production output is generally sold to the party that previously provided the capital. From the perspective of Islamic contracts, this condition requires attention because when capital provision is followed by an obligation or commitment to sell production output to the capital provider, the relationship between the two transactions needs to be explained transparently so that each party understands their respective rights and obligations (Mbanaso et al., 2009).

Price determination also demonstrates the importance of examining the relationship between the parties beyond the existence of an agreement itself. The research shows that business actors have the primary role in determining the purchase price, while farmers remain dependent on capital and marketing access. Farmers' limited capital affects their ability to determine selling prices and negotiate cooperation agreements. In the perspective of Islamic economic contracts, this condition emphasizes the importance of transparency in price determination. Price is not merely a figure in a transaction but constitutes part of an economic agreement that determines the benefits and burdens received by each party. Therefore, the basis for determining the price, the opportunity for negotiation, and the consent of the parties are important aspects in understanding the quality of the transaction (Sebenius, 1992)

At the same time, the available empirical data do not provide sufficient quantitative information to calculate the margin between the purchase price paid by business actors and the resale price in the market. Therefore, this research does not establish the amount of economic profit obtained by each party. This limitation is important because the interpretation of the contractual relationship must remain

consistent with the empirical evidence available.

Profit sharing constitutes another element that needs to be understood within the contractual relationship. The findings show that profit sharing is discussed and agreed upon at the beginning of the cooperation. However, the available data do not provide detailed information concerning the amount of capital provided by each farmer, production volume, production costs, purchase price per unit, profit-sharing percentage, or the amount of profit received by each party. Consequently, the findings are more appropriately understood at the level of the profit-sharing mechanism rather than as a measurement of profit distribution. From the perspective of Islamic economic contracts, this finding highlights the importance of clarity concerning the basis of calculation, distribution proportion, timing of distribution, and treatment of changes in production output (Amorim et al., 2013).

Production risk is also an integral element of the relationship. Salt production is highly dependent on weather conditions, while obligations related to capital remain part of the economic relationship when production does not meet expectations. Rainfall and the rainy season may cause declining production or even crop failure, while insufficient harvests may result in obligations being carried over to the following production season. From the perspective of Islamic economic contracts, this finding indicates the importance of clarity regarding risk distribution. A cooperation contract should not only regulate conditions when an enterprise generates profits but should also clarify the consequences when production declines or fails. Such clarity is important to prevent differences in understanding between the parties when they face conditions beyond their control (Zhang & Doll, 2001).

Overall, the empirical structure found in this research indicates that the contract does not stop at the provision of capital but functions as a mechanism connecting capital, production, sales, prices, profit sharing, capital repayment, and risks within a single economic transaction cycle. The structure of the relationship therefore demonstrates the need for clarity regarding the form of capital, rights and obligations, price mechanisms, profit sharing, capital repayment, and risk distribution. For this reason, the contractual structure should be examined through the principles of Islamic economic contracts and relevant literature rather than being directly categorized into a particular type of contract solely on the basis of terminology (Mohammed, 1988).

CONCLUSION

This research shows that the cooperation between salt farmers and business actors at UD. Setia Kawan, Pejarakan Village, is established as a capital relationship integrated with production-output transactions. Business actors provide capital and production needs, while farmers carry out the production process until harvest. The agreement is made orally and is based on trust, with provisions regarding capital, the sale of output, prices, profit sharing, and capital repayment agreed upon at the beginning of the cooperation.

In its implementation, production output is generally sold to the business actor who provides the capital. Price determination primarily considers market conditions, quality, and production quantity, while limited capital restricts

farmers' bargaining position in determining prices and transaction terms. Production risks, particularly those caused by weather conditions, are also an important part of the sustainability of the cooperation relationship because failure or low production output may affect farmers' ability to fulfill their capital obligations.

These findings demonstrate that the contract in this practice does not stop at a capital agreement, but functions as a mechanism that connects capital, production, sales, prices, profit sharing, capital repayment, and risks within a single economic transaction cycle. Therefore, the application of Islamic contract principles needs to be directed toward clarity of agreement, mutual consent, justice, transparency, and balance between the rights and obligations of the parties. The main contribution of this research lies in understanding Islamic contracts integratively as a mechanism governing the entire economic relationship, rather than merely as a form of contract at the time capital is provided.

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